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“Universal Duty and Global Justice” (Hand-out) 
 
The world we live in is characterized by strong inequality. This 
inequality concerns individuals: there are riche and poor persons (some of 
them are drammatically poor indeed). Inequality, however, also concerns 
states: There are powerful and weak, wealthy and miserable states. Many of 
us think that there are not good reasons for such an inequality. In other 
words, this inequality is unjust. 
  After sharing this sense of injustice, our intellectual strategies are 
often divided. Some believe that we should treat inequality from the 
individuals’ standpoint. Within this perspective that we will call 
“cosmopolitanism”, Injustice concerns primarily the socio-economic 
relationships between the single persons that inhabit our planet. As a  
consequence of the cosmopolitan outlook, we must give our personal 
support against inequality and we must create as soon as possible institutions 
able to remedy or at least to reduce this kind of injustice. According to 
others, however, to reason globally in terms of relationships between 
persons is simply misleading and wrong. According to this second 
perspective, that we will call “statism”, thee are peoples and states whose 
historical existence we cannot ignore. Following the statist position, a more 
just world is not –if not very indirectly- a world of persons equal among 
themselves, but rather a world of peoples and states able to realize a more 
just society within their borders.   
 Cosmopolitans, on the one side, are in favor of global distributive 
justice and socio-economic human rights. They believe in strong global 
justice. Statists, on the other side, don’t think that global distributive justice 
is theoretically defensible and practically feasible. At the most, they accept 
the validity of some socio-economic human rights and support 
humanitarianism. My paper is dedicated to a criticism of both cosmopolitans 
and statists. According to my thesis, they are both mistaken and there is a 
third more promising to locate ourselves on these topics.  
 I also maintain that we do not distinguish enough between a theory of 
global distributive justice –more or less an extension of domestic distributive 
justice to the world system- and the validity and efficacy of socio-economic 
human rights. Usually, cosmopolitans starting from strong global justice take 
socio-economic human rights as a corollary of it. Statists fully reject the idea 
of global distributive justice and sometimes even the validity and efficacy of 
socio-economic human rights. My third option claims that now we are not 
yet ready to properly accept a full theory of global distributive justice. But 
insists on the fact that we should be more open (then statists) on this topic 
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and that an extensive interpretation of socio-economic rights could be a 
promising starting point to reduce world inequality. We can also say that I 
base my vision on weak global justice. 
  My proposal is supposed to be particularly attractive from a post-
Rawlsian liberal point of view. As matter of fact, cosmopolitans tend to 
moralize international politics radically, considering political  institutions 
simply as means to realize their preferred moral ideals; statists, on the 
contrary, tend to reduce, if not to eliminate, the space of morality in 
international politics. My conception, finally, is neither moralist nor skeptic 
on the relationship between ethics and politics, and for such a reason could 
be labeled a “liberal conception”.  
In the paper, I try to reach this target in the paper in four sections. 
 
  In section 1, I start from an article by Thomas Nagel entitled “The 
Problem of Global Justice” (PPA 2005). Nagel’s main thesis, in the article, 
is that global distributive justice is theoretically indefensible. 
 Nagel’s mentors are Hobbes ands Rawls. According to Hobbes there 
is no justice without sovereignty. According to Rawls, the ideal of global 
justice is no more than the ideal of a world inhabited by the highest number 
of near-just states.    
 In his conception, that he calls “political conception”, Nagel offers 
two reasons for considering the extension of distributive justice theoretically 
impossible beyond the state. I will call the first one “institutional reason” 
and the second one “anti-monist reason”.  
 The institutional reason aims to demonstrate that there is not a global 
basic structure similar to the domestic basic structure. The difference is 
qualitative, the main reason for it being that at the global level citizens are 
not the authors of the laws that can coerce them.  
The anti-monist reason is based on the Rawlsian anti-perfectionist and 
pluralist attitude. According to anti-monism there cannot be continuity 
between personal or groups’ conception of the good and a public vision of 
justice. As a consequence of anti-monism, international institutions are 
supposed to be freestanding, which means relatively independent from any 
conception of the good.  
My claim is that this distinction between an institutional and an anti-
monist reason –both used against the possibility of global justice- is 
significant and has not been made clear within the standard doctrine. 
Cosmopolitans usually attack statism using arguments directed against both 
of them simultaneously. Moreover, cosmopolitans prefer to insist on the 
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institutional side of the argument, whereas I believe the anti-monist reason is 
philosophically more relevant and less investigated.  
 
Section 2 is dedicated to evaluate the cosmopolitan criticism of 
statism from the institutional side. I have to confess that I do not have a 
strong thesis on this point. Beyond commenting standard doctrine, I just 
admit that statism is probably right but too static. Now, in other words, there 
is not such a thing as a global basic structure: you cannot have a proper 
philosophical justification for it. But, and that’s why statists are also static, 
there is a progressive and factual legitimation of a global basic structure. 
 
In Section 3, I present my original proposal: there is an universal duty 
of justice. This universal duty has two necessary qualities: 
 
(i) it does not need any assumption of an already existing basic 
structure: 
(ii) it does not violate anti-monism 
 
My universal duty of justice depends on the duty to protect human 
dignity wherever it is at risk, independently from the existence of a previous 
basic structure. The main example of this duty I the Holocaust, but the 
continuous genocide of peoples that cannot eat and be cured is also a 
credible case for this kind of argument.  
The universal duty of justice presupposes the idea of human 
vulnerability. This is the reason why it can bypass anti-monist and pluralist 
principles. According to anti-monism and pluralism we must severely 
separate the good (personal) from the right (public). Just in case the human 
community is at risk –in my opinion- we are allowed to conceive an overlap 
of the good and the right. The exceptional nature of the case permits in such 
a way to overcome anti-monism. In other words, anti-monism is much more 
plausible when we are confronted with perfectionist super-goals. But much 
less when basic rights are at the stake. 
 
In the final Section 4, I connect the argument of the previous Section 
with the tradition of human rights and present some conclusions 
My liberal conception is based on weak global justice. Weak global 
justice is different both from cosmopolitanism and statism.  
(i) With statism, the liberal conception does not accept the 
existence of a global basic structure, being however more 
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open to the cosmopolitan thesis that sees it as a work in 
progress: 
(ii) With cosmopolitanism the liberal conception accepts a strong 
version of socio-economic rights, but does not make it 
dependent on a global basic structure and a monist 
perspective. 
        
 
 
          
